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Basic economic theory identi…es a number of e¢ciency gains that derive
from international capital mobility. But just as with free trade in goods,
there is no guarantee that capital mobility makes everyone better o¤. Con-
sequently, capital mobility may be politically unsustainable even though it
enhances e¢ciency. This paper discusses how such a dilemma might arise,
and suggests that international tax coordination might serve as a way out
under some circumstances.Basic economic theory identi…es a number of e¢ciency gains that derive
from international capital mobility. Free trade in capital allows a superior
utilization of resources, the spreading of risk, and ultimately a higher rate
of economic growth through the adoption of higher-yield, higher-risk ac-
tivities (Obstfeld 1994). But just as with free trade in goods, there is no
guarantee that capital mobility makes everyone better o¤. Consequently,
capital mobility may be politically unsustainable even though it enhances
e¢ciency. This paper discusses how such a dilemma might arise, and sug-
gests that international tax coordination might serve as a way out under
some circumstances.
We focus on a framework with symmetric countries, where the bene…ts
from capital mobility arise from the ability of capital-owners to diversify
country-speci…c risk. As long as shocks to domestic returns to capital are
not perfectly correlated across countries, risk-averse capitalists unambigu-
ously bene…t from international capital mobility. Risk-averse workers lose,
however, since the movement of capital in response to shocks induces ‡uc-
tuations in real wages and creates a source of risk for labor income. In other
words, capital mobility entails a negative externality for workers (Rodrik
1997, chap. 4). Reaping the e¢ciency gains of capital mobility, therefore,
may require …nding ways of sharing the bene…ts with workers.
There is some evidence that national governments, particularly of the
left-leaning kind, have recognized the potential adverse e¤ects of capital
mobility on workers and have tried to o¤set it. Focusing on 15 advanced
industrial countries over the 1967-90 period, Garrett (1995) …nds that gov-
ernments that have removed controls on capital ‡ows are likely to spend a
higher share of GDP, especially if they are run by parties of the left. Higher
volumes of trade, re‡ecting in part greater possibilities of outsourcing, are
also correlated with larger public spending in a broad sample of countries
(Rodrik 1998).
A subsidy for workers …nanced by a tax on capital income is the obvious
remedy for redistributing the gains from international capital mobility. But
a high level of international capital mobility poses a problem for such a
policy insofar as it enables domestic capitalists to evade the tax imposed
on them. Domestic …scal policy will be generally inadequate to undo the
costs imposed on workers by capital mobility. Therefore, to the extent that
workers support is needed for major policy changes, capital mobility may
not be politically sustainable when tax policy is determined at the national
level and unilaterally. The solution is tax coordination at the international
level. We show that, in the symmetric cases we focus on, there always exists
a coordinated tax regime which is Pareto-superior, and hence politically
sustainable.
Our argument for international tax coordination as a mechanism for
getting out of a political impasse-reaping the bene…ts of capital mobility
while compensating the losers-has, to our knowledge, not been developed in
1the academic literature. The discussion on tax coordination typically focuses
on the question of the extent to which capital mobility drives national tax
rates down, and on issues of institutional design regarding the selection of
a cooperative tax rate at the international level (see for example Gordon
1992 and Razin and Sadka 1991; Persson and Tabellini 1995 provide a nice
survey).
A paper by Persson and Tabellini (1992) is noteworthy in that it does
make the connection with domestic politics. This paper analyzes how na-
tional tax rates are determined in a model of a representative democracy
where voters take into account the constraint imposed by capital mobility.
They show that the downward pressure on tax rates can be ameliorated by
voters electing governments with stronger preference for taxes. Hence do-
mestic politics partially o¤sets the ine¢ciency of Nash-Cournot behavior at
the international level. While the underlying economic setup in our model
is quite di¤erent, our logic di¤ers from Persson and Tabellini (1992) in one
key respect: we require that no signi…cant group (i.e., labor) be a net loser.
This constraint raises the possibility that the compensatory adjustments in
national tax rates may not be feasible in the absence of explicit coordination.
1 The model
We will use a very simple model to capture the intuition described in the
introduction. We assume a two symmetric country world in which countries
produce and trade a single consumption good. This good is produced under
constant returns to scale andthroughcombination of capital andlabor. Each
country, a and b; is a¤ected by a particular productivity shock, "i whose joint








Let the production function in intensive form be described by
F(K;L) = L(f(k)+ "k);
with the usual regularity conditions: FK > 0; FL > 0; FKK < 0; FLL < 0
and FKL > 0: If we nomalize the consumption price to one, factor remuner-
ations are de…ned by:
ri = f
0
i + "i and wi = fi ¡ kif
0
i
with i = a;b: The demand for capital; is given by
ki = f
0¡1






The population of each country is assumed to be divided in two groups:
Workers and Capital Owners. Both types are risk averse and share the same
indirect utility function; V(I) with I the disposable income and V 0 > 0 and
V 00 < 0. They only di¤er in their factor endowment.
Consider the following problem. Both countries have to decide whether
to liberalize or not their capital market. By capital market liberalization,
we mean full mobility of capital among countries.
The sequence of events is the following:
(1) The capital owners propose a tax scheme to the workers in exchange of
capital market liberalization, in both countries simultaneously.
(2) Productivity shocks unfold
(3) Equilibrium investment and remuneration are determined
To asses the level of compensation needed to compensate workers from
the increased risk they face, we compute the welfare of each type of agent
with and without capital movement. We then check if this transfer level is
sustainable, i.e. that the pair of capital taxes is a Nash equilibrium of the
game played between the capitalist of both countries.
1.1 Welfare e¤ect of shocks when capital is immobile
As the decision about the liberalization of the capital market is taken before
the productivity shock unfold, we consider the expected welfare of each
type of agent. When capital market is not liberalized, equilibrium values
depend, in each country, only on the local productivity shock. Taking the
Taylor expansion of the utility function Vi(I) around "i; the expected utility
can be approximated in the following way:
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The remuneration of production factors depends only of the national pro-
ductivity shocks. Respectively, the net income of a capital owner and a
worker in country i; are given by
Iik = ri ¡ Ti and Iil = w +Tiki
3where Ti is the capital income tax. Di¤erentiating these expressions with
respect to the shock;
Iik




"i = 0 and Iil
"i"i = 0
Thus




aV 00k and EV l = V l("a;Ta)
Because of the production function we use, the capital owners are the
only ones a¤ected by the productivity shock. The larger its variance, the
lower the welfare of the capital owners. It is this relation that is important
for our result. Note also that the independence of the worker’s welfare to
the shock is useful to make our results clear.
1.2 Welfare e¤ect of shocks when the capital is perfectly
mobile
The liberalization of the capital market completely reallocates the distribu-
tion of risk among the two classes of agents. When shocks are negatively
correlated, capital mobility enables capital owners to diversify their risk, it
is therefore welfare improving. For workers, capital market liberalization
increases the risk they face. Here their own productivity shock a¤ects their
welfare: they pro…t (lose) from a positive (negative) productivity shock as
it induces in‡ow (out‡ow) of capital and therefore an increase of the labor
remuneration. Moreover, they are also a¤ected by the productivity shocks
in the other country, a positive (negative) foreign shock induces a capital
out‡ow (in‡ow) and therefore a loss (gain) on the worker point of view.
Let us see formally how this takes place in our model. Now the expected
welfare of each class of agent depends on the shocks of both countries. We
approximate the expected welfare via a Taylor expansion around ("a;"b):
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Perfect capital mobility and the source based nature of the capital tax
induce the following arbitrage conditions:
f
0a
k + "a ¡Ta = f
0b
k +"b ¡Tb = ½
4where ½ is the international remuneration of capital. Moreover the capital
market clearing condition implicitly de…nes ½(Ta;Tb;"a;"b)
ka(½ +Ta ¡"a) +kb(½ +Tb ¡"b) = Ka +Kb
A positive productivity shock increases the demand for capital and therefore









> 0 and if, for the ease of
computation, we assume that f
000
= 0; then
½"i"i = 0 and ½"i"j = 0
For further use let us compute the following derivatives:
dki
d"i





















Moreover, …scal policies in‡uence the international remuneration of capital










1.2.1 The expected welfare of capital owners
Taking the Taylor expansion of the utility function developed in (2), the
expected welfare is given by

















As we assume that countries are perfectly symmetric, ¾2
a = ¾2
b; "a = "b
and the tax levels without capital movement are equal, therefore, for these





1. We rewrite the expected welfare as follows:





Comparing this value to the expected welfare of the capital owner when
capital is immobile, we get






for Ta = Tb: This means that as long as shocks are not perfectly positively
correlated, the liberalization of the capital market enables the capitalists to
diversify their risk and is therefore welfare improving.
1Remember here that k
0
i is here a function evaluated at ("a;"b):
51.2.2 The expected welfare of workers
Let us now turn to the e¤ect on the worker’s expected welfare. The net
income of a worker is its gross wage plus direct subsidy.
Ili = wi + Tiki
where ki is the amount of capital invested in country i. As we saw in
the case of no capital mobility, the productivity shock does not directly
a¤ect the wage. Indeed it is through the capital movement that workers
are a¤ected. Moreover, the workers are a¤ected by the productivity shock
of both countries. A positive shock at home (abroad) induces a capital
in‡ow (out‡ow) and therefore an increase (decrease) of the gross wage and
also, given the capital tax level, an increase (decrease) of the transfer. It is
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This give us an expected welfare

















Taking values at the symmetric equilibrium,









Comparing this value to the expected welfare of the workers when capital is
immobile, we get









T ¡k)2) < 0
for a given capital tax level.
Workers are therefore hurt by this capital market liberalization and need
a compensation to accept capital market liberalization. Let T¤
i (Tj) be the
tax that exactly compensates the workers of country i, given the tax decided





















im the equilibrium expected welfare of workers when capital is im-
mobile.
The more negative the correlation between the shocks, the larger the
required transfer.
1.3 The …scal policy
Up to now we have considered the level of the transfer needed to compensate
the workers but we have not yet described how the …scal decisions are made.
It is assumed in this paper that a liberalization decision is going to be polit-
ically feasible if no group lose from it. Formally it takes the following form:
Capital owners make a ”take it or leave it” o¤er to the workers consisting
in a level of transfer (more precisely a source based capital income tax) and
a liberalization proposition. Workers accept it if the transfer compensates
the welfare loss they incure because of the risk they are exposed to. We
know that, when shocks are not perfectly correlated, there is an aggregate
gain from the liberalization. Capital owners are willing to compensate the
workers.
Nevertheless, if countries decide not to coordinate, capital owners when
making their o¤ers have to take into account the …scal decision of the other
country. As it has been showed in the former section, the level of capital tax
needed to compensate the workers depends on the tax imposed in the other
country. In the following sections, we show that when taxes are decided non
cooperatively, there are cases where it does not exist a capital tax level that
induces the workers to accept the capital market liberalization.The para-
dox is that even if they are willing to pay the transfers to succed in the
liberalisation of the capital market, capital owners are not able to commit
themselve to do it. Moreover, there is a competition between the two coun-
tries to attract the capital. Given the tax level of the other country, it could
be pro…table to both the capital owners and the workers to decrease their
tax level. Capital owners get a higher net remuneration. For the workers,
the loss of revenue from tax on the already invested capital can be more
than compensated by the increase of the tax base and the evaluation of the
wages.
We later show that, if there is …scal coordination, capital market liber-
alization will always be approved.
1.3.1 Fiscal competition
In a …rst stage, we shall assume that countries decide their …scal policy non
cooperatively. There is therefore a game which strategies are the capital
income taxes and the payo¤s the welfare of the capital owners given that
workers welfare is at least as large than under autraki. In this paper, we
limit the strategy space to pure strategies.
7Let us focus on one of the possible non-cooperative equilibria, the sym-
metric one. This symmetric equilibrium is the smallest pair of taxes (T¤;T¤)
that solves (3) for the two countries. The smallest pair as the welfare of cap-
ital owners is a decreasing function of taxes.
Such a symmetric pair of tax satis…es the workers welfare constraint in
both countries. To be a non-cooperative equilibrium, it should be that there
do not exist pro…table deviations(i.e. tax undercutting). This deviation
pleases the capitalist as it increases ½: It is therefore pro…table if it does not
violate the workers welfare constraint. It is easy to show that when T¤ is















The intuition is the following; a decrease of Ti increases the level of capital
investment in the country, therefore increases the remuneration of workers
and the tax base. When T¤ is large, these two e¤ects more than compensate
the decrease in the tax level.
Therefore, under no coordination, when the transfer required to com-
pensate the workers is large, i.e. when agents are highly risk averse or when
shocks have a large variance and are highly negatively correlated, the sym-
metric taxation is not an equilibrium.
Would an other equilibrium exist? To the unilateral deviation of one
country, the other responds either by increasing its capital tax or by un-
dercutting the other country tax level. The status quo is not acceptable
as at that point the workers welfare constraint is not anymore ful…lled in
both countries. An increase of the tax level would not rebalance the worker
welfare constraint for the reason evoked to make the …rst deviation prof-
itable. The only solution to balance the worker constraint is to undercut
the other country tax level. A a new symmetric taxation would not ful…ll the
constraint as (T¤;T¤) is the lowest symmetric taxation that ful…lled both
countries constraint. No asymmetric equilibrium is going to come out of
this as, for each equilibrium, at least one of the country does not ful…ll its
workers welfare constraint. No symmetric equilibrium is going to emerge as
the only candidate was destroyed.
Therefore, there do not exist other asymmetric equilibria with capital
mobility. We can conclude that in this case, if there is no coordination of
capital tax, full capital mobility is not going to be allowed.
Nevertheless, when T¤ is not too large, the symmetric candidate is an
equilibrium. In this case, there could also be some asymmetric equilibria.
These asymmetric equilibria would be dominated by the symmetric one
because capital allocation is ine¢cient in case of asymmetric equilibria. It
is therefore natural to concentrate only on the symmetric equilibrium.
81.3.2 Fiscal coordination
We showed in the last paragraph that there does not always exists an
equilibrium to the non-cooperative …scal game between the two countries,
and therefore, without coordination, pro…table capital market liberalization
could be rejected.
Would then tax coordination enhance the situation?
In case of coordination, we assume that there is a bargaining among
two countries’ capital owners in order to decide at which level the capital
taxes should be set. As bargaining solutions have to be e¢cient ex-ante we
restrict ourself to symmetric taxation. The bargaining outcome is then the
(T¤;T¤) tax levels that we described in the former paragraph. This solution
maximizes the joint welfare of the capital owners given the workers welfare
constraint.
Proposition 1 When agents are highly risk averse and when productivity
shocks are negatively correlated, …scal coordination is a necessary condition
for capital market liberalisaton to be politically sustainable. Moreover, there
always exists a coordinated tax regime which is Pareto-superior, and hence
politically sustainable.
This proposition emphasises the need for …scal coordination to enable
the completion of the capital market liberalisation. In this model, the pros
…scal coordination are the capital owners as it enables them to commit to
redistribution and therefore to have the workers accepting the liberalisation
of the capital market.
2 Conclusion
In this paper, we identi…ed a tension existing when capital market liberaliza-
tion is considered. Capital market liberalization calls for more redistribution
while making this redistribution more di¢cult. We showed that when the
transfer required to compensate the workers is large enough, without …s-
cal coordination, capital market liberalization is not politically sustainable
while e¢cient. Fiscal coordination plays as a commitment device for the
capitalist to pay their tax after the capital market liberalization.
Obviously, liberalization decisions are not so abrupt. Capital movements
are impeded not only by legal barrier but also by other limitations, like the
di¤erence in the legal system, in the language or in the cultural habits or
even technological problems. The perfect mobility of capital is going to be
the result of a long process. What our paper argues, is that this process
could be interrupted if no …scal coordination take place. The form that the
coordination should take is an other question. In this paper, coordination
take the form of full harmonization. This result drastically depends on
9assumption we made about the symmetry between the two countries. Would
the number of countries be larger or the countries asymmetric, it is likely
that the coordination mechanism would be di¤erent. It could be that, like
in van Ypersele (1998), a more elaborate coordination system is needed.
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